32 research outputs found
Relocation and investment in R&D by firms
The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed corporate location decisions when firms invest in R&D to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining their domestic plants. In contrast, we here consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by investing in R&D and likewise by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to relocate.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Anticipating the location of a waste collection point : an application based on Portugal
We study the optimal location of a waste facility in a horizontally differentiated duopoly where firms choose their location and price. The policymaker decides the location of a waste facility targeting social welfare maximization. Consistent with the observation of the location decisions of waste facilities in Portugal, we show that the optimal location of a waste facility is never in the city center under partial expost regulation. Ex-ante regulation ensures the highest level of social welfare, but from a theoretical point of view, it requires a waste facility located in the city center. A robustness check is then provided to justify that, in actual regulatory practice, a first-mover regulator maximizes social welfare without necessarily imposing the installation of a waste facility in the city center.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly
Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Fi- nally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?
We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed pricesetting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payo equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves if the most plausible equilibrium is realized in the market. Hence, in this case it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists
Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms
Endogenous timing, Mixed oligopoly, Semipublic firms, Cournot competition, L33, L13,
Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?
Partial privatization, Cost efficiency gap, Foreign competitors, Free entry, H42, L3, C72,
Timing of endogenous bargaining over costs and firms’ locations
Endogenous costs, Firms’ locations, Bargaining, J51, L13,